Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. Much of the extant research on this topic is either model specific or relies on weaker notions of equilibria. We observe that when this original game is modified to ensure that the leader problems have shared constraints, much can be said about the existence of equilibria. In particular, when the leader objectives also admit a potential function, equilibria exist under mild conditions. Although the conventional formulation of the multi-leader multi-follower game does not have shared constraints, we present certain modified formulations that do have shared constraints. We also identify conventional formulations that can be addressed by our theory without the need for modifications. When the leader objectives admit a potential function, we show that the global minima of this potential function over the shared constraint, solutions of a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), are equilibria of the shared constraint multi-leader multi-follower game. We also show that local minima, B-stationary points, strong-stationary points and second-order strong stationary points of this MPEC are local Nash equilibria, Nash B-stationary points, Nash strong-stationary points and Nash second-order strong stationary points of the associated multi-leader multi-follower game. We note through several examples that such potential multi-leader multi-follower games capture a breadth of application problems of interest. We also derive a general existence result that extends beyond potential games and clarifies the theoretical properties of shared-constraint games. Our results are supported by analytical and computational studies of Cournot-based multi-leader multi-follower games and spot-forward power markets under uncertainty, both of which are potential multi-leader multi-follower games. From such studies it emerges that equilibria of multi-leader multifollower games with shared constraints are often easier to compute by the Gauss-Seidel heuristic than their conventional counterparts. Furthermore, for potential games, solving an MPEC provides amongst the first convergent avenues for computing global equilibria of such games and such approaches appear to require far less effort than the Gauss-Seidel heuristic.
Introduction
Contemporary market models in imperfectly competitive regimes are complicated by the need to capture the rationality of a participant to the fullest extent possible. For instance, power markets are often characterized by a sequence of clearings, such as in the day-ahead and real-time markets. Consequently, models of these strategic interactions require a firm to be modeled as not just strategic with respect to its rivals but also as cognizant of the real-time market clearing to follow [43, 41, 36] . Similarly, generation more tractable. Shared-constraint games have a structure that allows us to claim the existence of an equilibrium for a subclass of games in which the leader's payoffs admit a potential function, which is our second idea. For this subclass of games, which we refer to as potential multi-leader multi-follower games, the existence of equilibria can be claimed despite the above difficulties of nonconvexity and without invoking continuity properties. Indeed the equilibrium is given by the global minimizer of the potential function with respect to certain equilibrium constraints. Furthermore, local minimizers of this potential function are local equilibria of this multi-leader multi-follower game.
In a game with shared constraints, there exists a common constraint that constrains each player's optimization problem [34, 8, 24] . The conventional formulation of a multi-leader multi-follower game bears a close resemblance to shared-constraint game, but is technically not a shared-constraint game, since each leader has a private conjecture of the equilibrium outcome of the follower problem (this will be clarified later in the paper). We present two alternative formulations of multi-leader multi-follower competition that result in a shared-constraint game. For example, one such modification imposes that leaders be constrained to have consistent beliefs regarding the follower equilibrium. Such a consistency requirement also appears to have been employed by Leyffer and Munson [26] . We also identify classes of conventional models (without the need for modifications) which are not shared-constraint games, but have a structure amenable to application by our theory. The existence of equilibria to all such games is guaranteed under the presence of a potential function, allowing for a theory that applies to a variety of settings. Naturally, one may immediately be concerned regarding the restrictive nature of potential multi-leader multi-follower games. Yet, we observe that a large proportion of multi-leader multi-follower games studied in literature do indeed fall within this category, suggesting that this class of games has significant practical utility.
Our overall approach does not leverage continuity properties of the solution set of the follower problems. In avoiding this dependence, it provides tractable and verifiable conditions for guaranteeing the existence of equilibria for a broad class of multi-leader multi-follower games with shared constraints. The main result is built on observing that for potential multi-leader multi-follower games with shared constraints, a global minimizer of an MPEC is an equilibrium of the game. As such for potential multileader multi-follower games, the result suggests a natural algorithm: the computation of equilibria reduces to obtaining a global minimizer of an MPEC. While this is a difficult problem in its own right, there are global solvers for subclasses of MPECs [18, 19] and we believe that our framework has now isolated a precise class of global optimization problems of importance. Before proceeding, we briefly summarize our main contributions:
• Global equilibria: We show that the global equilibria of shared constraint modifications of the traditional multi-leader multi-follower game can be obtained as global minimizers of an MPEC, when the leader-level payoffs admit a potential function. We identify subclasses of multi-leader multi-follower games for which this property holds without resorting to a shared constraint modification. As a consequence, existence of equilibria follows directly from making compactness or coercivity assumptions on the MPEC. Finally, via fixed-point theory, we provide a more general existence result for games that are not potential games.
• Local equilibria: We show that local minimizers and B-stationary points of this MPEC are local Nash equilibria and Nash B-stationary points of the associated shared constraint multi-leader multi-follower game. Furthermore the strong-stationary and second-order strong stationary points of this MPEC are Nash strong-stationary and Nash second-order strong-stationary points of this game.
• Computational experiments: Analytical and computational results are presented to support the findings. In particular, we show that for some well studied Cournot games, global minimizers of the relevant MPECs are equilibria of the original game. More general problems arising in Cournot regimes as well as in stochastic spot-forward power markets are analyzed numerically. We find that the MPEC solutions are indeed equilibria of the associated shared constraint games and expectedly, such solutions require far less computational effort. In addition, we observe superior performance of Gauss-Seidel schemes for computing equilibria of shared constraint multi-leader multi-follower games.
The remainder of the paper is organized into six sections. In Section 2, we survey multi-leader multifollower games studied in practice, provide some background and comment on what makes conventional formulations of multi-leader multi-follower games intractable. In Section 3, we present modifications that lead to a shared constraint game and show why these models are relatively tractable. In Section 4, we develop existence statements for potential multi-leader multi-follower games while illustrative examples and numerics are provided in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. The paper concludes in Section 7 with a brief summary.
Multi-leader multi-follower games: examples and background
Multi-leader multi-follower games assume relevance when modeling hierarchical competitive interactions. In Section 2.1, we initiate our discussion through several examples considered in literature with the intent of noting that in a majority of these instances, the associated objective functions of the leaders admit a potential function, thereby also noting the utility of this class in practice. A general formulation for such games and the associated equilibrium problem is provided in Section 2.2. In Section ??, we conclude this section with a brief commentary on the challenge in applying standard approaches.
Examples of multi-leader multi-follower games
The multi-leader multi-follower game is inspired by a strategic game in economic theory referred to as a Stackelberg game [39] . In such a game, the leader is aware of the follower's reaction and employs that knowledge in making a first move. The follower observes this move and responds as per its optimization problem. An extension to this regime was provided by Sherali et al. [38] where a set of followers compete in a Cournot game while a leader makes a decision constrained by the equilibrium of this game. While multi-leader generalizations were touched upon by Okuguchi [30] , Sherali [37] presented amongst the first models for multi-leader multi-follower games in a Cournot regime. A majority of multi-leader multi-follower game-theoretic models appear to fall into three broad categories. We provide a short description of the games arising in each category:
Hierarchical Cournot games: In a hierarchical Cournot game, leaders compete in a Cournot game and are constrained by the reactions of a set of followers that also compete in a Cournot game. We discuss a setting comprising of N leaders and M followers, akin to that proposed by Sherali [37] . Suppose the i th leader's decision is denoted by x i and the follower strategies conjectured by leader i are collectively denoted by {y where (x i , y i ) is a solution of L i (x −i , y −i ) for i = 1, . . . , N . In this regime, under identical leader costs, Sherali [37] proved the existence and uniqueness of the associated equilibrium. More recently, DeMiguel and Xu [6] extended this result to stochastic regimes wherein the price function is uncertain and the leaders solve expected-value problems.
Spot-forward markets: Motivated by the need to investigate the role of forward transactions in power markets, there has been much interest in strategic models where firms compete in the forward market subject to equilibrium in the real-time market. Allaz and Vila [1] examined a forward market comprising of two identical Cournot firms and demonstrated that global equilibria exist in such markets. Furthermore, it was shown that the presence of such a market leads to improved market efficiency. Motivated by the possibly beneficial impacts of forward markets on consumer welfare (cf. [14, 22] ), such models have gained increasing importance in the examination of strategic behavior in power markets which are generally characterized by a sequence of clearings in the forward, day-ahead and real-time markets. The result of Allaz and Vila hinges on the assumption that the follower problems are quadratic programs and follower reactions satisfy inequality constraints strictly; consequently, the follower reactions reduce to linear equality constraints. Su [41] extended these existence statements to a multi-player regime where firms need not have identical costs. In such an N -player setting, given the forward decisions of the players {x i } N i=1 , firm i solves the following parametrized problem in spot-market:
where c i y i is the linear cost of producing y i units in the spot-market and p(.) is the price function in the spot-market. In the forward market, firm i's objective is given by its overall profit, which is given by −p f x i − p(ȳ)(y i − x i ) + c i y i , where p f denotes the price in the forward market. By imposing the noarbitrage constraint that requires that p f = p(ȳ), the forward market objective reduces to c i y i − p(ȳ)y i . Firm i's problem in the forward market is given by the following:
Note that while the spot-forward market problem is closely related to the hierarchical Cournot game, it has two key distinctions. First, leader i's cost is a function of forward and spot decisions. Second, every leader's revenue includes the revenue from the second-level spot-market sales. As a consequence, the problem cannot be reduced to the hierarchical Cournot game, as observed by Su [41] . In related work, Shanbhag, Infanger and Glynn [36] conclude the existence of local equilibria in a regime where each firm employs a conjecture of the forward price function. Finally, in a constrained variant of the spot-forward game examined by Allaz and Vila, Murphy and Smeers [29] prove the existence of global equilibria when firm capacities are endogenously determined by trading on a capacity market and further discover that Allaz and Vila's conclusions regarding the benefits of forward markets may not necessarily hold.
Transmission-constrained power markets: Cardell, Hitt and Hogan [5] modeled the interactions between a collection of a large power generation firms that may also hold transmission rights and a competitive fringe, as a multi-leader multi-follower game; more specifically, the larger firms are viewed as leaders while the competitive fringe comprises of a set of followers. Weber and Overbye [42] also considered a bilevel game-theoretic framework where generation firms make linear supply bids while the follower problem is given by the optimal power flow problem solved by the system operator. Subsequently, Hobbs, Metzler and Pang [16] considered a related model where generation firms are cast as leaders while the system operator is viewed as the follower. In this model, at the lower-level, the independent system operator (ISO) solves an allocation problem subject to Kirchhoff's law constraints and capacity bounds. If q s j and q d j denotes the supply and demand at node j,
captures the generation cost at node j given generation bids, denoted by α, the social welfare is given by
where the first term captures the aggregate consumer surplus over all the while the second term measures aggregates cost of supply, D represents the set of demand nodes and P represents the set of generation firms. The system operator's problem can be cast as the following convex program:
where Q represents the feasibility requirements induced by network constraints, power flow constraints and capacity bounds, t specifies the flows across the transmission network, h(.) represents a set of affine supply-demand requirements with λ denoting the associated locational marginal prices. At the upperlevel, generation firm i maximizes revenue from sales less generation costs over a set of nodes S i , as captured by the following parametrized problem:
where q s,i , q d,i , t i and λ i denote firm i's conjecture of the associated ISO decisions q s , q d , t and λ. The resulting equilibrium is given by
where (α i , q s,i , q d,i , t i ) is a global minimizer of F i (α −i ) with multiplier λ i , given α −i . In work on related bidding models by Hu and Ralph [21] , the authors show the existence and uniqueness of a global equilibrium.
We conclude this section with two observations. First, almost all of the existence results are modelspecific and are not more generally applicable to the class of multi-leader multi-follower games. Second, in a majority of the instances surveyed above, the leader objectives admit a potential function. For instance, in hierarchical Cournot games, if the associated price functions are affine, then the resulting game is a potential multi-leader multi-follower game (cf. [28] ). In the spot-forward games, the leader's objectives are dependent only on follower decisions; consequently, the payoffs are independent of competitive decisions and this can be immediately seen to be a potential multi-leader multi-follower game. Finally, the third class of games broadly encompasses problems in power markets where leaders are generation firms and the sole follower is represented by the independent system operator. There are settings where the leader level game is indeed a potential game such as when firms bid the intercepts of their supply function [16, 21] .
Conventional formulation of multi-leader multi-follower games
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , N } denote the set of leaders. In the usual formulation of multi-leader multi-follower games, leader i ∈ N solves a parametrized MPEC of the following kind.
subject to
Here x i ∈ R m i denotes leader i's strategy and we have used the usual notation
Furthermore, y i denotes the tuple of strategies of all followers with the requirement that y i be an equilibrium of the Nash game amongst the followers. Note that this Nash game is parametrized by the tuple of leader strategies x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ). For each x, the set of follower equilibria are the solutions of the variational inequality (VI), VI(G(x, ·), K(x)), and are denoted as SOL(G(
Henceforth we abbreviate
Though y i is not strictly within leader i's control, a minimization over y i is performed by a leader who is assumed to be optimistic; a pessimistic leader would maximize over y i while minimizing over x i . The sets X i and Y i represent other constraints and are assumed to be closed convex sets. For each i, objective function ϕ i is defined over X × Y , where
Y i and assumed to be continuous. Let y = (y 1 , . . . , y N ) and Ω i (x −i , y −i ) be the feasible region of L i (x −i , y −i ), given by
where R n is the ambient space of the tuple (x, y). Let Ω(x, y) denote the Cartesian product of
An important object in our analysis is the set F defined as
which is the set of tuples (x, y) such that (x i , y i ) is feasible for L i (x −i , y −i ) for all i. It is easily seen that F is the set of fixed points of Ω, i.e. F = {(x, y) ∈ R n : (x, y) ∈ Ω(x, y)}. We refer to Ω as the feasible region mapping and denote the EPEC associated with this multi-leader multi-follower game by E .
Definition 2.1 (Global Nash equilibrium) Consider the multi-leader multi-follower game E . The global Nash equilibrium, or simply equilibrium, of E is denoted by
where (x, y) ∈ F and satisfies the following:
Eq (5) says that at an equilibrium (x, y), (x i , y i ) lies in the set of best responses to (x −i , y −i ) for all i.
The qualification "global" is useful in distinguishing the equilibrium from its stationary counterparts (referred to as a "Nash B-stationary", "Nash strong-stationary", etc.) or its local counterpart (referred to as a "local Nash equilibrium"). In this paper, our main focus is on global Nash equilibria and we refer to them as simply "equilibria"; other notions are qualified accordingly.
Intractability of the conventional formulation
At the Nash equilibrium, each player's strategy is his "best response" assuming the strategies of his opponents are held fixed. For any tuple of strategies z = (z 1 , . . . , z N ), one may define a reaction map (set-valued in general) as
where R i (z −i ) is the solution set of player i's optimization problem obtained from assuming the opponent's strategies fixed at z −i . The Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of this map. When the feasible region of each player's optimization problem is convex and independent of his opponent's strategies, and each player's objective function is convex in his own strategy, R is upper semicontinuous and convex-valued. Thus if the space of strategies of players, which forms the domain of R, is also compact, Kakutani's fixed point theorem yields the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Due to the nonconvexity of problems {L i } i∈N there appears to be no simpler characterization of an equilibrium of the game E than through the fixed-point of its reaction map. However, difficulties arise when one attempts to apply fixed point theory to this reaction map. For game E the reaction map is a map R : dom(Ω) → 2 range(Ω) , where
Almost all fixed point theorems rely on the following broad assumptions:
(a) the mapping to which a fixed point is sought is assumed to be a self-mapping; (b) (i) the domain of the mapping and (ii) the images are required to be of a specific shape, e.g. convex;
(c) the mapping is required to be continuous (if the mapping is single-valued) or upper semicontinuous (if set-valued).
The first difficulty encountered is that R is not necessarily a self-mapping: R maps dom(Ω) to range(Ω) and range(Ω) may not be a subset of dom(Ω). Second, dom(Ω) is hard to characterize and little can be said about its shape. Finally, the continuity (or upper semicontinuity) of R is far from immediate. There are ways of circumventing difficulties (a) and (b), some of which have been employed in literature.
If Ω(x, y) = ∅ for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y , we have dom(Ω) = X × Y and R may be taken to be a map from X × Y to subsets of X × Y . This approach was employed by Arrow and Debreu [2] . If X × Y is convex, as is in our case, the difficulty (b(i)) is also circumvented. The (upper semi-)continuity of R requires Ω to be continuous [10] , a property that rarely holds if S (the solution set of a VI) is multivalued. As a consequence, the shape of the mapped values ((b.ii)) and the upper semicontinuity of R are the key barriers to the success of this approach. In the case where S is single-valued, the continuity of R follows readily. A majority of the known results for EPECs are indeed for this case. These challenges motivate the consideration of a modified, but closely related, shared-constraint game where such concerns get alleviated. This is the goal of the next section.
Shared constraint formulations
In this section we present alternative models of multi-leader multi-follower competition that result in a shared-constraint game and highlight analytical properties of these models. In Section 3.1, we provide a background of shared-constraint games and in Section 3.2, we present shared constraint variants of the conventional formulation. In Section 3.3, we consider special cases of E that are not shared-constraint games, but can nevertheless addressed through our approach.
Background
Shared constraint games were introduced by Rosen [34] as a generalization of the classical Nash game. In a shared-constraint game, there exists a set C in the product space of strategies such that the constraints faced by the players are as follows: for any player i, and for any tuple of strategies of other players (denoted z −i ), the feasible strategies z i for player i are those that satisfy (z i , z −i ) ∈ C. Let the objective functions of the players be {f i } i∈N . The equilibrium of this game is a point z = (z 1 , . . . , z N ) such that
Equivalently [15] , z is an equilibrium if z ∈ Ω C (z) and for all i
where
These games can be extended to coupled constraint games in which the constraints are not necessarily shared. In such a game, an equilibrium is a point z such that
Here Ω NS i is any convex-valued set-valued map, not necessarily of the form of a shared constraint. The key difference between Ω NS and Ω C is that Ω C is completely defined by its fixed point set, given by C, whereas Ω NS is not. However in both cases, the equilibrium is a point that lies in the fixed point set (given by ∩ N i=1 C i for Ω NS , where C i is the graph of Ω NS i ). The shared-constraint game is a special case of this with
The conventional formulation of multi-leader multi-follower game is a coupled constraint game with not necessarily shared constraints. The feasible region mapping Ω defined in (3) (where Ω i (x −i , y −i ) is the feasible region of L i (x −i , y −i )) is a shared constraint if Ω has the following structure: for (x, y) in the domain of Ω,
It is easy to check that this condition does not hold in general for the mapping Ω, whereby E is in general a coupled constraint game without shared constraints. Furthermore, each leader problem L i is constrained by the equilibrium conditions of the follower game which, if the follower problem has constraints, is nonconvex. Coupled with the inherent lack of continuity of Ω, this makes E a challenging problem to both analyze and solve computationally. Shared constraint games arise naturally when players face a common constraint, e.g. in a bandwidth sharing game, and are an area of flourishing recent research; see [9, 24] . Less is known in literature about coupled constraint games without shared constraint even with convex constraints. On the contrary, much has been said about shared constraint games when the common constraint C is convex (see particularly, the works of Rosen [34] , Facchinei et al. [8] , Kulkarni and Shanbhag [24, 25, 23] and Facchinei and Pang [12] ). Therefore it is tempting to conjecture that in the case where the Ω is a shared constraint the multi-leader multi-follower game will be more amenable to a general theoretical treatment.
Theoretically speaking, a powerful feature of shared constraint games is that a modified reaction map can be constructed whose fixed points are also fixed points of the reaction map R but does not suffer from most, but not all, of the difficulties that R suffers from. We discuss this in Section 4.3. Potential games with shared constraints allow for another closely related construction wherein the solutions of an optimization problem emerge as fixed points of R. This is shown in Section 4.1.
Modifications leading to a shared constraint game
Multi-leader multi-follower games bear a natural resemblance to shared-constraint games: each leader in such a game is constrained by the equilibrium amongst the same set of followers. However, in EPEC E we see that the feasible region mapping Ω defined in (3) is not necessarily a shared constraint (i.e. it does not satisfy (8)). In this section, we present two modifications of the conventional formulation for which the resulting games have shared constraints. These formulations are arrived at by adding constraints to the MPECs {L i } i∈N . As a consequence, the obtained formulations are weaker than E in the sense that equilibria of E are equilibria of the games resulting from these alternative formulations, but the reverse does not hold. The barrier to the satisfaction of (8) is the possible disparity in the conjectures y i that leaders make regarding the follower equilibrium (recall that the equilibrium of the followers is a decision variable for each leader); indeed, in one of our formulations we show that imposing consistency of conjectures makes the constraint shared.
Modification 1: Leaders sharing all equilibrium constraints: Consider the formulation in which the i th leader solves the following optimization problem.
We denote this game by E ae and note that the difference between E ae and E is that all constraints y j ∈ S(x), j = 1, . . . , N are now a part of each leader's optimization problem. In effect, each leader takes into account the conjectures regarding the follower equilibrium made by all other leaders. The result is that for any i, y i satisfies the same constraints in problems L i and L ae i , but x i is constrained by additional constraints in L ae i . For y j ∈ Y j , x j ∈ X j for j = i, let Ω ae i (x −i , y −i ) be the feasible region of L ae i (x −i , y −i ) and let Ω ae , F ae , S N and G are defined as
where G is the graph of S N and F ae is the set of fixed points of Ω ae . An equilibrium of E ae is a point
The modification E ae is weaker than E in the sense that an equilibrium of E is an equilibrium of E ae , as formalized next.
Proposition 3.1 Consider the multi-leader multi-follower game defined by E ae . Then the following hold:
(i) The mapping Ω ae (x, y) is a shared constraint mapping satisfying (8);
(ii) A point (x, y) is a fixed point of Ω ae if and only if it is a fixed point of Ω;
(iii) Every equilibrium of E is an equilibrium of E ae .
Proof :
(i) It can be seen that for any i and any x −i , y −i , where x j ∈ X j , y j ∈ Y j for all j = i, we have that
where G is defined in (10) . Thus Ω ae is a shared constraint of the form dictated by (8) .
(ii) It suffices to show that F = F ae . But, from (i) it follows that F ae = (X × Y ) ∩ G, and it is also seen that F equals (X × Y ) ∩ G. The result follows.
(iii) An equilibrium (x, y) of E lies in F and thereby in F ae . Since Ω ae
Modification 2: Leaders with consistent conjectures: We consider a modification wherein an endogenous consistency requirement is imposed on the conjectures made by leaders about follower equilibria. More specifically, we impose a requirement that y 1 = y j , for all j > 1 as a part of each leader's optimization problem; the resulting game, denoted E cc , is shown to be a shared constraint game. In this game the i th leader solves the following problem.
Leyffer and Munson [26] have studied a closely related formulation in which exactly one of the leaders can make conjectures regarding follower responses, while all of the remaining leaders take this follower response as a parameter. Our formulation assumes that each leader makes his decision with the assumption that his conjecture about the follower equilibrium is the same as conjecture of every other leader. Comparing L i with L cc i we see that x i satisfies the same constraints in both problems, but
and
where F cc is the set of fixed points of Ω cc . An equilibrium of E cc is a point
The following relations hold for this formulation.
Proposition 3.2 Consider the multi-leader multi-follower game defined by E cc . Then (i) Ω cc is a shared constraint mapping satisfying (8).
Furthermore, if S is single-valued, then the following hold:
(iii) Every equilibrium of E is an equilibrium of E cc .
(i) It can be observed that for any i and any
But, y j ∈ S(x), j = 1, . . . , N implies that y ∈ S N (x). Let A be the set
It follows that
Thus Ω cc is a shared constraint of the form required by (8) .
(ii) From (i) it follows that
It suffices to show that F ⊆ F cc . Let a tuple (x, y) belong to F. Since S is single-valued, y belongs to A and consequently (x, y) ∈ F cc .
(iii) An equilibrium (x, y) of E is in F, and so by (ii), (x, y) ∈ F cc . Since
We note certain subtle but important points about the consistency of conjectures of follower equilibria made by leaders. Consider the case where S is single-valued and let (x * , y * ) be an equilibrium of the conventional formulation E . It is clear from Lemma 3.2 that (x * , y * ) lies in F cc . Equivalently, (x * , y * ) lies in Ω(x * , y * ) and since S is assumed to be single-valued, y * ∈ A. Consider an arbitrary point (x, y) in Ω(x * , y * ). This point (x, y) does not necessarily satisfy the consistency of y (i.e. y does not necessarily belong to A), whereby it is not necessary that (x, y) belong to Ω cc (x * , y * ). The reason is as follows: (x, y) ∈ Ω(x * , y * ) implies that for each i, x i , y i satisfy y i = S(x i ; x * ,−i ); but the terms S(x 1 , x * ,−1 ), . . . , S(x N , x * ,−N ) may not all be equal. Therefore y is not necessarily in A. Thus, in the conventional formulation E , even while the equilibrium (x * , y * ) satisfies the consistency requirement, a point (x, y) ∈ Ω(x * , y * ) which is feasible for individual MPECs {L i } i∈N need not. On the other hand, in the formulation E cc any point (x,ȳ) ∈ Ω cc (x * , y * ) that is feasible for individual MPECs {L cc i } i∈N necessarily satisfies the consistency requirement. This is because E cc is a more restrictive formulation: Ω cc (x * , y * ) is nonempty only for those y * that belong to A whereby any (x,ȳ) ∈ Ω cc (x * , y * ) must satisfȳ y = y * and thus must satisfyȳ ∈ A.
In summary, there is a distinction between the consistency of conjectures at equilibrium alone (as in E with single-valued S) and the stronger requirement of consistency of conjectures in the optimization problem of each leader (as espoused by E cc ). The former is ensured by the single-valuedness of S in the conventional formulation. For the latter, consistency has to be explicitly enforced, as done in E cc . Furthermore, in E cc , consistency at equilibrium and in the optimization problems is ensured even in the case where S is multivalued.
Remark 3.1. (Comparison of E ae and E cc ) When S is multi-valued, formulations E ae and E cc are quite different. Indeed, E ae retains equilibria of E even when S is set-valued, while such a property seems plausible for E cc only under the single-valuedness of S. On the other hand, when S is singlevalued, E ae and E cc are equivalent. This is easy to see by comparing the optimization problems L ae i and L cc i , i ∈ N .
Special cases of E that do not require modification
In this section, consider special cases of the conventional formulation that can be addressed with our approach. These games are not necessarily shared-constraint games, but their equilibria can be guaranteed by the existence results proved for shared-constraint games in Section 4. Thus they can be handled analytically with the same level of ease as shared-constraint games. We include them here for sake of continuity; the existence results are applied to these formulations in Section 4.
Case 1: Leaders solving bilevel optimization problems: The game in which leaders solve bilevel optimization problems also has shared constraints. Consider a game where the i th leader solves
Since y i ∈ S i (x i ), there is no coupling of leader decisions in the constraints of leader problems. This is a special case of E with S(x) ≡ i∈N S i (x i ), where S i (x) is the solution of a variational inequality for each i. Let Ω bl i be the feasible region of L bl i (x −i , y −i ) and let F bl be the set of fixed points of Ω bl
Since there is no coupling, it is easily seen that
Clearly, Ω bl is a shared constraint.
Case 2: Leaders with objectives independent of follower equilibrium: We consider the case where the i th leader solves the following problem wherein the objective is independent of y i .
Observe that we have assume that Y i = Y j =Ȳ for all i, j. Furthermore notice that y i is a variable of the above MPEC, though it does not appear explicitly in the objective. We denote this game by E ind . This game, though not a shared constraint game, obeys the existence results we describe in Section 4.
Analysis of multi-leader multi-follower games with shared constraints
In this section, we present the main results of this paper, which pertain to the existence of the equilibria of multi-leader multi-follower games with shared constraints, in particular of the formulations introduced in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3. In Section 4.1, we develop existence results for these formulations when leader objectives admit potential functions. In Section 4.2 we relate local minimizers and stationary points of the potential function with the associated local Nash and Nash stationary equilibria of these games. In Section 4.3, we situate our findings in the larger context of shared-constraint games and give an existence result that goes beyond potential games. Finally, in Section 4.4, we relate the equilibria obtained from the shared constraint modifications to the equilibria of the conventional formulation.
Potential games and existence of global equilibria
We present existence statements for shared constraint variants of multi-leader multi-follower models presented in Section 3.2 (E ae and E cc ) and 3.3 (E bl and E ind ). Recall that both categories of formulations are EPECs -i.e., in these formulations, the optimization problem of each leader is indeed constrained by an equilibrium constraint -and are thus hard problems in their own right. In the remainder of this paper we deal mainly with these formulations. We use E S to denote any one of them, i.e., E S ∈ {E ae , E cc , E bl , E ind } and {L S i } i∈N , Ω S to denote the leader problems and the feasible region mapping of E S . F S denotes the fixed point set of Ω S . The existence results of this section pertain to potential multi-leader multi-follower games [28] , which are defined next. 
If ϕ i is a continuously differentiable function for i = 1, . . . , N , then it follows [28] that π is continuously differentiable. In this case π is a potential function if and only if
e., if and only if the mapping F
The following lemma follows from a well known characterization of integrable mappings. Proposition 4.1 Consider a multi-leader multi-follower game in which the objective functions ϕ i , i ∈ N of the leaders are continuously differentiable. Then the game is a potential game if and only if for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y , the Jacobian ∇F (x, y) is a symmetric matrix.
We now present our main result relating the equilibria of potential multi-leader multi-follower games with shared constraints and the global minimizers of the potential function over the shared constraint, i.e., of the following MPEC:
To facilitate the arguments, we provide two distinct results, of which the first captures games excluding E ind while the second focuses only on E ind .
Theorem 4.2 (Minimizers of P S and Equilibria of E S ) Let E S be a potential multi-leader multifollower game with a potential function π such that E S = E ind . Then any global minimizer of π over F S is an equilibrium of E S .
Proof : Let (x, y) ∈ F S be a global minimum of π over F S . Then, for each i ∈ N
since Ω S is a shared constraint. Using this, together with the fact that π is a potential function, we obtain that for each i
This implies that for i = 1, . . . , N , given (x −i , y −i ), the vector (x i , y i ) lies in the set of best responses for leader i. In other words, (x, y) is a fixed point of R and an equilibrium of Ω S .
Next, we provide a similar result for the class of multi-leader multi-follower games constituted by E ind . Theorem 4.3 (Minimizers of P S and Equilibria of E ind ) Consider the multi-leader multi-follower game E ind . Then if (x, y) is a global minimizer of π over F, then (x, y) is an equilibrium of E ind .
Proof : We prove this by contradiction. Suppose (x, y) is a global minimizer of π over F such that (x, y) is not a fixed point of R or (x, y) / ∈ R(x, y). Then there exists (u, v) ∈ Ω(x, y) and leader i such that
We have
given as
Since (x, y) lies in F, and x j ∈ X j , for all j, the constructed point x i lies in X. Trivially, y i belongs to Y = i∈NȲ and since v i ∈ S(x), it follows that y i ∈ S N (x). It follows that the point (
This contradicts (14) . The proof is complete.
Having developed a relationship between the minimizers of the potential function and the equilibria of multi-leader multi-follower games, it follows that if the minimizer of P S exists, the game E S admits an equilibrium. Following is our existence result for E S . Theorem 4.4 (Existence of equilibria of E S ) Let E S be a potential multi-leader multi-follower game with a potential function π. Suppose F S is a nonempty set and ϕ i (x) is a continuous function for i = 1, . . . , N . If the minimizer of P S exists (for example, if either π is a coercive function on F S or if F S is compact), then E S admits an equilibrium.
Proof : It is easy to see from (12) that π is continuous. By the hypothesis of the theorem, π achieves its global minimum on F S . This could, for instance, be deduced from the coercivity of π over a nonempty set F S or by the compactness of F S Based on Theorem 4.2, a global minimizer of π is an equilibrium of E S and the result follows.
At this juncture, it is worth differentiating the above existence statement from more standard results presented in [37, 41] where the follower equilibrium decisions are eliminated by leveraging the singlevaluedness of the solution set of the follower equilibrium problem. In these approaches, the final claim rests on showing that the "implicitly" defined objective function is convex and continuous, properties that again require further assumption. In comparison, we do not impose any such requirement.
Remark 4.2. Notice that the only properties assumed in this result are the shared nature of the constraint Ω S (except in the case of E ind ) and the existence of a potential function. As such, the above result applies to any other shared constraint formulation of the multi-leader multi-follower game having a potential function, and is not limited to the formulations of E ae , E cc and E bl .
Stationary points of the potential function and Nash stationary equilibria
In general, the global minimization of π over F S is hindered by the nonconvexity of F S as well as the possible nonconvexity of π. When solved computationally, standard nonlinear programming solvers may only produce a suitably defined stationary point of P S . Traditionally, while a range of stationarity points are considered in the context of MPECs [35] , we focus on two notions of stationarity, Bouligand stationarity and strong stationarity. In addition, we also consider local minimizers of P S . In this section, we relate these stationary points and local minimizers to their equilibrium counterparts in the context of E S . We begin with a formal definition of a Nash Bouligand stationary or a Nash B-stationary point. 1
where T (z; K), the tangent cone at z ∈ K ⊆ R n , is defined as follows:
Proposition 4.5 (B-Stationary points of P S and Nash B-stationary points of E S ) Consider the multi-leader multi-follower game E S and suppose {ϕ i } i∈N are continuously differentiable functions over X × Y that admit a potential function π. If (x, y) is a B-stationary point of P S , then (x, y) is a Nash B-stationary point of E S .
Proof : First consider the case of E S = E ind . A stationary point (x, y) of π over F S satisfies
Fix some i ∈ N and consider an arbitrary (dx i , dy i ) ∈ T (x i , y i ; Ω S i (x −i , y −i )). By the definition of the tangent cone, there exists a sequence Ω S (
, where
satisfies (x i,k , y i,k ) ∈ F S . Therefore, the direction (dx i , dy i ) where
. . , 0) and dy i = (0, . . . , dy i , . . . , 0), belongs to T (z; F S ). Substituting (dx, dy) = (dx i , dy i ) in (15) and using that π is a potential function gives
Since, i ∈ N and (dx i , dy i ) ∈ T (x i , y i ; Ω S i (x −i , y −i )) were arbitrary, (x, y) is a Nash B-stationary point of E S .
Now suppose E S = E ind . In this case, π is independent of y so π can be viewed as a function of x only. Therefore (x, y) is a stationary point of the minimization of π over F if and only if x is a stationary point of the minimization of π (with a slight abuse of notation) over the set F |X {x ∈ X | ∃ y : (x, y) ∈ F}, i.e. if and only if x satisfies
Furthermore, x is a Nash stationary point if for all i ∈ N ,
As above, fix some i ∈ N and an arbitrary (dx i , dy i ) ∈ T ((x i , y i ); Ω i (x −i , y −i )). By definition, there
It follows that the sequence (x i,k , y i,k ), where
satisfies (x i,k , y i,k ) ∈ F for all k. Therefore the vector dx i = [0, . . . , 0, dx i , 0 . . . , 0] belongs to T (x; F |X ). Substituting dx = dx i in (17) and using (13) gives
Arguing as in the earlier case, it follows that (x, y) is a Nash B-stationary point of E ind .
We now define a local Nash equilibrium and show its relationship to the local minimum of P S .
Definition 4.3 (Local Nash equilibrium)
Proposition 4.6 (Local minimum of P S and local Nash equilibrium) Consider the multi-leader multi-follower game E S with potential function π. If (x, y) is a local minimum of P S , then (x, y) is a local Nash equilibrium of E S .
Proof :
The proof is analogous to that of Theorems 4.2 and 4.3. We prove only the case where E S = E ind ; the other case follows in a manner similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3. If (x, y) is a local minimum of P S , there exists a neighborhood of (x, y), denoted by B(x, y), such that
Consider an arbitrary i ∈ N and let B i (x i , y i ;
Thus, using this relation in (19) and employing (12), we get
In other words, (x i , y i ) is a local minimizer of L S i (x −i , y −i ). This holds for each i ∈ N , whereby (x, y) is a local Nash equilibrium.
When the algebraic form of the constraints are available, a strong-stationary point can be defined.
, where c i , d i are continuously differentiable and in the case of E ind , d i is independent of i. Let S(x) be given the solution of a complementarity problem: π(x, y) subject to
The constraint in Ay = 0 is present only for E S = E cc and it corresponds to the consistency of conjectures: A = {y|Ay = 0}, cf. (11) . To define the stationarity conditions, we define the relaxed nonlinear program below which requires specifying the index setsĨ 1i andĨ 2i for i = 1, . . . , N wherẽ I 1i ,Ĩ 2i ⊆ {1, . . . , p} andĨ 1i ∪Ĩ 2i = {1, . . . , p}.
where [·] j denotes the j th component of '·' andĨ ⊥ 1i ,Ĩ ⊥ 2i denote the complements ofĨ 1i ,Ĩ 2i respectively. Further, we refer to the both index sets colllectively asĨ i and the collection of index sets {Ĩ 1 , . . . ,Ĩ N } byĨ. Note that in accordance with [13] , we define the index sets independent of the point (x, y). We may now state the strong stationarity conditions at a particular point (x, y). Definition 4.4 (Strong-stationarity point of P S ) A point (x, y) ∈ F S is a strong stationarity point of P S if there exist Lagrange multipliers η i , µ i , λ i and β i , i ∈ N (and an additional Lagrange multiplier γ if E S = E cc ) such that the following conditions hold:
, ∀i ∈ N , (20)
where [A γ] i denotes the components of A γ corresponding to y i .
Having defined the strong stationarity conditions, we are now in a position to define the second-order sufficiency conditions. These assume relevance in defining a local Nash equilibrium; loosely speaking, at a local Nash equilibrium, every agent's decision satisfies the MPEC-second-order sufficiency or the MPEC-SOSC conditions, given the decisions of its competitors. Furthermore, corresponding to a stationary point of P S rnlp , we may prescribe an active setÃ(x, y) such thatÃ(x, y) {Ã 1 (x, y), . . . ,Ã N (x, y)} ∪ A γ (x, y), whereÃ i (x, y) denotes the set of active constraints corresponding to the set of constraints
,Ã e i (x, y)}, whereÃ c i ,Ã d i andÃ e i denote the active sets associated with c i (x i ) ≥ 0, d i (y i ) ≥ 0, and the remaining constraints, respectively. The specification of the active set allows us to define the critical cone S * (x, y) as
where a j denotes the constraint gradients of the j th constraint.
Definition 4.5 (Second-order Strong-stationarity point of P S ) A point (x, y) of the optimization problem P S is a second-order strong stationary point of P S if it is a strong stationary point with Lagrange multipliers (η, µ, λ, β) (or (η, µ, λ, γ, β) when E S = E cc ) and s T ∇ 2 x,y L s > 0 for s ∈ S * (x, y), where S * (x, y) is given by (21) and ∇ 2 x,y L denotes the Hessian of the Lagrangian of P S rnlp with respect (x, y) evaluated at (x, y, η, µ, λ, β) (or at (x, y, η, µ, λ, γ, β) when E S = E cc ).
Next, we provide a formal definition of Nash strong-stationary and Nash second-order strongstationary points of E S , which requires defining the critical cone S * i (x, y) for each leader i = 1, . . . , N :
where A i (x, y) 2 denotes the active set utilized in defining the relaxed nonlinear program associated with L S i (x −i , y −i ) and a j denotes the constraint gradient associated with j th constraint.
Definition 4.6 (Nash strong-stationary and Nash second-order strong-stationary points) A point (x, y) ∈ F S is a Nash strong-stationary point of E S if for i = 1, . . . , N , and based on the form of E S , there exist
such that the following conditions hold:
2 The active set associated with P S rnlp is denoted byÃ while the active set associated with leader i's problems is denoted byÃi.
Furthermore, (x, y) is a Nash second-order strong stationary point of E S if (x, y) is a Nash strong stationary point of E S and if for i = 1, . . . , N ,
Having defined the relevant objects, we now show that a strong-stationary point of P S is a Nash strong-stationary point of E S and a second-order strong-stationary point of P S is a second-order strongstationary point of E S . For i = 1, . . . , N , one may define a corresponding relaxed NLP associated with the i th leader's problem, namely L S i (x −i , y −i ), by employing the index sets I i . These index sets are defined usingĨ and are specified as follows: 3 (i) For E S = E ae : Since, this formulation has all the leader-specific equilibrium constraints, I i = {Ĩ 1 , . . . ,Ĩ N };
(ii) For E S = E cc : Here, given that only firm i's equilibrium constraints are imposed, I i =Ĩ i ;
(iii) For E S = E ind , E bl : As above, I i =Ĩ i .
Proposition 4.7 (Strong stationary points of P S and Nash strong stationary points of E S )
Consider the multi-leader multi-follower game with shared constraints E S . Suppose (x, y) is a strongstationary point of P S and satisfies (20) with Lagrange multipliers given by the following:
Then (x, y) is a Nash strong-stationary point of E S and for i = 1, . . . , N , (x, y) satisfies (23) with Lagrange multipliers defined as:
Furthermore, if (x, y) is a second-order strong stationary point of P S with multipliers given by (a) or (b), then (x, y) is a Nash second-order strong stationary point of E S with firm i's multipliers given by (i), (ii) or (iii).
Proof : Suppose (x, y) is a strong stationary point P S , i.e., suppose there exist multipliers η, µ, λ and β such that for (x, y), system (20) holds. For each kind of E S , we show that (x, y) is a Nash strong stationary point of E S . One may then construct Lagrange multipliers to satisfy (23).
(i) For E S = E ae : By comparison of (20) and (23), we see that (23) admits a solution (x, y) with
(ii) For E S = E cc : As above, (23) admits a solution (x, y) with multipliersη i = η i ,μ i = µ i ,λ i = λ i andβ i = β i andγ i = γ. 3 The index sets associated with P S rnlp are denoted byĨ while the index sets employed for specifying leader i's relaxed NLP are denoted by Ii. Note that the cardinality ofĨi and Ii differs when considering the relaxed NLPs corresponding to E ae since every leader level problem contains equilibrium constraints of all the leaders.
Now assume that (x, y) is a second-order strong stationary point of P S . To show that (x, y) is a Nash second-order strong stationary point of E S , we construct Lagrange multipliers as above. It is easy to see, that by construction,
where L i is the Lagrangian of L S i evaluated at (x, y) and the above constructed Lagrange multipliers. Furthermore, by comparing the feasible region of L S i with F S , we observe that the active sets of L S i can be defined as follows: , y) , . . . ,Ã e N (x, y) .
Given the specification of the active set, we may now define a relaxed NLP corresponding to this active set as well as define the corresponding critical cone S * i (x, y). To prove the claim, we proceed by contradiction. If (x, y) is not a Nash second-order strong stationary point, then for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, the point (x i , y i ) does not satisfy second-order strong stationary conditions, given (x −i , y −i ). Then there exists a w i such that
We may now define w such that
where w j = 0, j = i. Since w i ∈ S * i (x, y), it follows that
By definition of w, it follows that w ∇ x,y π(x, y) = 0. From the definition of w and by noting the constructions of A i (x, y), it can be seen that w ∈ S * (x, y). As a consequence, we have that
But this contradicts the hypothesis that (x, y) is a second-order strong stationary point of P S and the result follows.
Remark 4.3. (Relationship to variational equilibria in shared constraint games) Formulations E ae and E cc have shared constraints. For instance, in the context of E ae , the following constraint is common across all leaders:
Such games are referred to as generalized Nash games and equilibria of such games are referred to as generalized Nash equilibria (GNE). The variational equilibrium or VE is referred to as a GNE in which the Lagrange multipliers, corresponding to the shared constraints, are consistent across players. These multipliers can be interpreted as the shadow prices of the associated constraints. Furthermore, when these prices are common, the equilibria can be viewed as corresponding to a uniform auction price while disparities in prices may be a consequence of discriminatory prices. A detailed study of the VE and its ramifications for convex shared constraints is the subject of Kulkarni and Shanbhag [24] . The Nash strong-stationary points of E ae , E cc which are obtained as strong stationary points of P S have common multipliers are, in effect, variational equilibria. In E ae , the multiplier for the k th constraint is β k i which is equal for all leaders i. Analogously, in E cc , the common multipliers are given byγ i , the multiplier of the consistency requirements, which is again equal for all i ∈ N . Finally, it should be noted that Leyffer and Munson [26] also employ consistent multipliers for follower responses in their price consistent formulations.
Beyond potential games
What makes EPECs with shared constraints more tractable than those arising from the conventional formulation? In this section we attempt to answer this question in conceptual terms through the construction of a modified reaction map, denoted Υ, whose fixed points are equilibria of E S . In comparison with the reaction map R, Υ has properties that are more favorable for the application of fixed point theory. This leads to an existence result for E S that does not assume the existence of a potential function; however it makes requirements on the mapped values of Υ for which simple sufficient conditions have escaped us. We touch upon this topic in this section. We also show that, in the case when a potential function exists, there is a close relation between the fixed points of Υ and the global minimizers of the potential function.
To define the modified reaction map let Ψ :
and consider the map modified reaction map Υ :
We show below that a fixed point of Υ is an equilibrium of E S . The map Υ is analogous to that used by Rosen [34, Theorem 1] . We begin by considering the case of E S = E ind . Observe that in this case,
is independent ofȳ. Lemma 4.1 (Fixed points of Υ and equilibria of E ind ) Consider the multi-leader multi-follower game E ind and its modified reaction map Υ. Every fixed point of Υ is an equilibrium of E ind .
Proof : We prove this by contradiction. Let (x, y) ∈ Υ(x, y) and (x, y) / ∈ R(x, y). Therefore, there exists (u, v) ∈ Ω(x, y) and leader i such that
where u i ∈ X i , v i ∈Ȳ , v i ∈ S(u i ; x −i ). Let (x,ȳ) be given bȳ
Since (x, y) ∈ F, x j ∈ X j , for all j, wherebyx ∈ X. Clearly,ȳ ∈ Y = i∈NȲ and since v i ∈ S(x), it follows thatȳ ∈ S N (x). It follows from that (x,ȳ) ∈ F. Consequently, we have that
This contradicts (x, y) ∈ Υ(x, y).
We now prove a similar result for the more general setting via a different avenue.
Theorem 4.8 (Fixed points of Υ and equilibria of E S ) Consider the game multi-leader multi-follower game E S with a feasible region mapping Ω S . If Υ admits a fixed point, the game E S admits an equilibrium.
Proof : It suffices to show that a fixed point of Υ is a fixed point of the reaction map R (cf. (6)). Lemma 4.1 shows this for E S = E ind . We show this for the other cases; recall that for these cases Ω S satisfies (8) . Assume that the claim is false, i.e., assume there exists an (x, y) ∈ Υ(x, y) such that (x, y) / ∈ R(x, y). Then there exists (u, v) ∈ Ω S (x, y) and an index i ∈ {1, . . . , N } such that
a contradiction to (x, y) ∈ Υ(x, y).
Theorem 4.8 and the fixed point formulation through Υ leads to a more tractable problem than that obtained from R. This is a consequence of noting that by the following result, Υ is upper semicontinuous under mild conditions. Lemma 4.2 Let Ψ be continuous on F S × F S and assume that the infimum in (25) is achieved by a point (x,ȳ) ∈ F S for each (x, y) ∈ F S . Then Υ is closed and nonempty. If Υ is locally bounded, it is upper semicontinuous. If Υ is locally bounded and single-valued, then it is continuous (as a single-valued function).
Proof : Nonemptiness of Υ follows from the assumption that the infimum is achieved. Closedness and upper semi-continuity follows from classical stability results, see e.g., Hogan [17] . The last claim is obvious as a special case of upper semicontinuity of set-valued maps for single-valued maps.
Note that local boundedness of Υ is implied by the compactness of F. Recall the discussion from Section 2.3 and the three difficulties mentioned in applying fixed point theory to R. Notice that the difficulties due to (a) (requirement that the function be a self-mapping) and (c) (requirement of upper semicontinuity) that arise in R do not appear Υ: Υ is a self-mapping and because the infimum in (25) is over a set that is independent of (x, y), the upper semicontinuity of Υ is easily obtained. The requirement of (b) (shape of the mapped values of Υ) remains a hurdle. Using the Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed point theorem [7] , we get a general existence result. 
Remark 4.4.
A natural question is when such conditions are useful. In general, convexity or contractibility of images of Υ is not immediate; however, if there are specific settings where such claims can be made, then the aforementioned results are powerful in that they do not require assumptions of potentiality on the leader payoffs.
It is not true that every equilibrium of the EPEC with shared constraints is a fixed point of Υ; existence of a fixed point to Υ is only a sufficient condition for such an equilibrium to exist. This can be checked easily by considering a hypothetical case with convex F S , wherein it is well known that fixed points of R and Υ can be very different. In [24] , Kulkarni and Shanbhag discuss these issues in detail: in general, there exist fixed points of R that are not fixed points of Υ and also games for which there are fixed points to R, but none to Υ.
Remark 4.5. When F S is convex, Lemma 4.8 and the map Υ also has an interesting connection with the "variational equilibrium" [9, 12, 24] in games with convex shared constraints. If ϕ i is convex in (x i , y i ), fixed points of R are the generalized Nash equilibria [15] of the game. The variational equilibrium is defined as the solution of the variational inequality VI(F S , F ), where F = (∇ 1 ϕ 1 ; . . . ; ∇ N ϕ N ), and the set of variational equilibria can be seen to given by the set of fixed points of Υ. Theorem 4.9 did not invoke the existence of a potential function. Nonetheless, there is a close relation between the minimizer of the potential function, i.e. the solution of problem P S , and the fixed points of Υ. We formalize it through the following definition. Definition 4.7 A stationary fixed point of Υ is a point (x, y) ∈ F S with the property that (x, y) is satisfies the stationarity conditions of the minimization of Ψ(x, y, u, v) over (u, v) ∈ F. i.e.,
.
We have the following relation.
Proposition 4.10 Let E S be a potential game with potential function π. Then any global minimizer of π over F S is a stationary fixed point of Υ. Conversely, every stationary fixed point of Υ is a stationary point of the minimization of π over F S .
Proof :
The result hinges on the observation that ∇π(x, y) ≡∇Ψ(x, y, x, y).
So if (x, y) ∈ F S is a global minimum of π over F S , then, by the necessary conditions of optimality,
The result follows from Definition 4.7. Conversely, using 4.7, it is easy to see that a stationary fixed point of Υ is a stationary point of P S .
Clearly, if F S is convex, a global minimizer of π is indeed a fixed point of Υ.
Comparison with the original non-shared constraint formulation
In this section, we relate its equilibrium to the equilibrium of the shared-constraint variants of multileader multi-follower games to those of the conventional formulation without the shared constraint modifications. In the case where for every x ∈ X, S(x) is a singleton belonging to ∩ i∈N Y i , the implicit programming approach for MPECs [27] provides a way for showing that certain equilibria of E ae (or E cc ) are equilibria of E (recall that Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 showed the opposite claim). Implicit programming approaches have also been used in for multi-leader multi-follower games, e.g. by Sherali in [37] and Su in [41] , to show the existence of an equilibrium to the conventional formulation E . It is worth noting that one result of this flavor can be obtained directly from our previous results. Specifically, consider a the game E ind , which is in the conventional form, and its modification E ind,ae (in the form E ae ). Since F = F ae (by Proposition 3.1), the modified reaction map for E ind is the same as that of E ind,ae and, in the case where E ind admits a potential function π, the problem P S is the same for E ind and E ind,ae . Consequently, those equilibria of E ind,ae that are fixed points of the modified reaction map (and those that are minimizers of π in P S ) are also equilibria of E ind . One cannot however claim that every equilibrium of E ind,ae is an equilibrium of E ind .
To make a similar claim more generally about the conventional formulation E , assume that S is single-valued and consider the modification E ae (this game is equivalent to E cc when S is single-valued). We have F = {(x, y) | x ∈ X, y = S N (x)} = F ae . Substituting the follower equilibrium tuple y in terms of x in the definition of Υ we get
If x is a fixed point of Γ S , then (x, S N (x)) an equilibrium of E ae . For simplicity of exposition we will refer to fixed points of Γ S as "equilibria" of E ae . Now consider the original formulation E and rewrite the leader problem L i in the following form.
It is easy to see that an "equilibrium" of this game is the same as a fixed point of Γ : X → 2 X , where
The following theorem exploits the similarity between Γ S and Γ to develop conditions under which the fixed points of Γ S are also fixed points of Γ. Theorem 4.11 Suppose for all x ∈ X, S(x) is a singleton lying in ∩ i∈N Y i and let the objectives of players be such that
Then every fixed point of Γ S is also a fixed point of Γ and thus an equilibrium of E . In particular, if Γ S admits a fixed point, the conventional formulation E admits an equilibrium.
Proof : If x is a fixed point of Γ S ,
By the hypothesis of the theorem, we have
which means x is a fixed point of Γ.
Remark 4.6. Notice the difference between Γ and Γ S . Importantly, observe that a fixed point of one is not necessarily a fixed point of the other. This may come as a surprise, considering that Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 show that equilibria of E are also equilibria of E ae and E cc . But this "contradiction" can be explained by noticing that fixed points of Γ are equilibria of E ae and E cc , but such equilibria need not be fixed points of Γ S . Since the fixed point formulation through Υ or Γ S is only a sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria of E ae or E cc , there may exist equilibria of these games that are not necessarily fixed points of the Γ S .
Two illustrative examples
In this section, we present some illustrative examples that highlight important features of the theory we have developed so far. We begin by discussing an important example from [32] of a multi-leader multi-follower game formulation the conventional form, having a potential function but yet having no equilibrium. We show that its modification in the form E ae does have an equilibrium.
A multi-leader multi-follower game with no equilibria
In 2005, Pang and Fukushima [32] presented an example of a multi-leader multi-follower game formulated in the conventional way that this has no equilibrium. It can be observed that this game has a potential function but is not a shared-constraint game. However, what emerges an important finding is that the modified shared constraint variant of E , in the form of E ae , does indeed admit an equilibrium.
Example 5.1. Consider a multi-leader multi-follower game comprising of 2 leaders and 1 follower.
The lone follower is assumed to solve the optimization problem
Each leader has an objective function independent of the strategies of the other leader.
By substituting for y 1 , it can be observed that L 1 is a convex programming problem. However L 2 is not a convex program and can be rewritten as the following nonsmooth nonconvex program:
The resulting reaction maps in the (x 1 , x 2 ) space are given by the following:
It is easy to see R 2 is not upper semicontinuous and that R has no fixed point. Thus, this game has no equilibrium. Now consider the following problem in which both leaders see both equilibrium constraints (in the form of E ae ). Note that this modification is equivalent to the modification of the form of E cc since follower problem solution (i.e., S(·)) is single-valued.
This is clearly a shared constraint game with
Furthermore, this game admits a potential function:
The global minimizer of π over F ae is arg min
It follows from Theorem 4.2 that ((x 1 , x 2 ), (y 1 , y 2 )) = ((0, 1), (0, 0)) is an equilibrium of the modified game.
To clarify the consequences of the modification observe the objectives of the two leaders at equilibrium. Leader 1 gets ϕ 1 (0, 0) = 0 whereas leader 2 gets ϕ 2 (1, 0) = − 1 2 . Leader 1's global minimum is 0 and he thus has no incentive to deviate from this strategy. Leader 2's strategy set at equilibrium reduces to a singleton containing only his equilibrium strategy. This is induced by the presence of leader 1's equilibrium constraint in his optimization problem (the constraint y 1 = max{0, 1 − x 1 , x 2 } is, at equilibrium, equivalent to 0 = max{0, 1 − x 2 }; together with the constraint x 2 ∈ [0, 1] this implies x 2 = 1 and y 2 = 0.) We thus see that the additional constraints in E ae facilitate the existence of an equilibrium.
All multi-leader multi-follower games when modified to a shared constraint form may not admit equilibria. In fact, the nature of the leader problems is crucial in ascertaining whether such games do indeed admit equilibria. More specifically, we note that if the leader objectives admit a potential function, much can be said about the existence of equilibria. In the above example, the key feature of the game is that the leader objectives are independent of the strategies of other leaders. Consequently, any such game admits a potential function. The above example can thus be generalized through the following corollary of Theorem 4.4.
Corollary 5.1 Consider a multi-leader multi-follower game E S for which F S is nonempty and ϕ i , i ∈ N are continuous. Assume further that for each i ∈ N , ϕ i (x i , y i ; x −i ) ≡ ϕ i (x i , y i ), i.e., assume that ϕ i is independent of x −i . If, either functions ϕ i are coercive or if F S is compact, the game E S has an equilibrium.
Then by Theorem 4.2, the game has an equilibrium.
A hierarchical Cournot game
The following is a multi-leader multi-follower game from [37] that is a Cournot game. When formulated in the conventional form it has an equilibrium. Through this game, we will demonstrate the validity of Propositions 3.1, 3.2 and Theorem 4.2. Below, we modify this game in the form of E ae (which in this game is equivalent to E cc ) and show that the claim made in Proposition 3.1 holds: the equilibrium of this game is also an equilibrium of its modification. The example also casts light on why existence of equilibria to games with shared constraints is more easily guaranteed. The equilibrium conditions of E ae have more variables, and thus allow for more "degrees of freedom" their satisfaction. Cournot games, as noted in Section 2.1, admit potential functions. We then calculate the minimizer of the potential function of this game (i.e., the solution of P S ) and show that it is an equilibrium of the modified game, thereby verifying Theorem 4.2.
Example 5.2. Let E be a game with N identical leaders and n identical followers. The follower strategies conjectured by leader i are denoted by {y f i } f =1,...,n (we use f to index followers) and we let y 
where y f i ∈ R is the conjecture of leader i of the equilibrium strategy of follower f . Follower f solves the problem (F(ȳ −f , x)):
where constants a, b, c are positive real numbers. Since these constants are the same for all followers, equilibrium strategies of all followers are equal. Consequently the follower equilibrium tuple conjectured by leader i is given by y i = ( y i , . . . , y i ), where y i satisfies y i ∈ SOL(F((n−1) y i , x)) (sinceȳ −f = (n−1) y i ). For any x, there is a unique y i that satisfies this relation, given by
By considering only the first of above cases in (26), we get a restricted game where leader i solves
This is a generalized Nash game with coupled but not shared constraints. However, since the optimization problems of the leaders are convex (this is not obvious; see [37, Lemma 1] for a proof), we may use the first-order KKT conditions to derive an equilibrium. Letλ i be the Lagrange multiplier corresponding the constraint "
The equilibrium conditions of this game are
We can verify that the tuple x = x * where all leaders play the same strategy x, i.e. x * i = x for all i with x given by
satisfies equilibrium conditions for the restricted game {L i } i∈N . The optimal Lagrange multiplier is given byλ * i = −nbx * i ,μ * i = 0. It can then be verified that this equilibrium also satisfies the requirement i x * i < a/b, whereby it is an equilibrium of the original game. The other case of y i = 0 does not result in an equilibrium that satisfies i x i > a/b, consequently x * is the only equilibrium.
Verifying Proposition 3.1 (An equilibria of E is an equilibrium of E ae ): Let us now consider this game modified as E ae . Since the follower equilibrium is unique for every x, this formulation is equivalent to E cc , cf. Remark 3.1.
Notice that the equilibrium constraint is now for all f and for all k. For any k, the equilibrium constraint may be simplified using (26) , giving an equation in y k . It is easy to check that this game also admits no equilibrium with j x j > a/b. Thus, this game is equivalent to the game where j x j is constrained to be in [0, a/b]. For such values of j x j , the first case of (26) applies, and it gives us a game where leader i solves
This is a generalized Nash game with (convex) shared constraints and convex optimization problems for leaders. Let λ k i be the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraint "
The equilibrium conditions for the generalized Nash equilibrium (see [24] ) of this game are
Notice that the Lagrange multipliers λ j i for j = i are unconstrained barring their presence in the first condition of (28) . Comparing (28) and (27) , we see that ifλ * , x * solve system (27) , then x = x * and λ j i =λ * i I {j=i} for all i, j ∈ N gives a solution to system (28) . Consequently, an equilibrium of the original game E is an equilibrium of E ae . We have thereby verified Proposition 3.1 for this problem.
The presence of surplus Lagrange multipliers provides us with more variables than the number of equations, whereby existence of solutions is easier to guarantee. An equilibrium of E is an equilibrium of the modified game E ae with a specific configuration of the vector of Lagrange multipliers. Consequently, if an equilibrium exists to E ae , there is no guarantee that there exists one to the original game E .
Verifying Theorem 4.2 (Global minimizer of π is an equilibrium of E ae ): Applying the same arguments as before, we can effectively consider the strategies of leader i in game E ae as x i and y i . Further, suppose the function π is given by
where y ( y 1 , . . . , y N ). Notice that the map F (cf., Lemma 4.1) is given by
and that ∇π ≡ F , whereby π is a potential function for E ae . The set F ae for this game is
We now determine the global minimizer of π over F ae . A significant difficulty in characterizing the global minimizer of π is that π is not necessarily convex (despite the convexity of the objectives of leaders in their own variables).
We argue as follows. By membership of (x, y) in F ae , we either have y i = a−b P j x j c+b(n+1) for all i or we have y i = 0 for all i. Substituting for y, we can write π as a function only of x (with a slight abuse of notation)
By symmetry, the values x i that minimize π are equal for all i. Let x i = x for all i be the minimizer. Then,
The right hand derivative of 
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint 'a/(N b) − x ≥ 0'. If x , µ is a solution of system (29) , then x i = x , µ i = µ and λ j i = −nbx j = −nbx for all i, j ∈ N , solves system (28) for the equilibrium of E ae . Consequently x = (x , . . . , x ) is an equilibrium of E ae . This verifies Theorem 4.2.
It should be emphasized that we have claimed that a solution to the concatenated first-order KKT conditions of the minimization of π over F ae is a global equilibrium of E ae , a claim that is valid because the leader problems in E ae have been reduced to convex problems. In the case where S is single-valued (as it was in this example), this is possible because we could argue that for values (x, y) of interest, the equation y = S(x) is linear in x, y.
Numerical experiments
The key contribution of this paper lies in deriving existence statements for a class of multi-leader multi-follower games with shared constraints, specifically those that admit potential functions. In this section, we perform numerical experiments to support these claims. First, in Section 6.1, we consider a variant of the multi-leader multi-follower Cournot game [37] which does not have shared constraints and numerically compare its equilibria to the minimizers of its the potential function. While no globally convergent scheme is currently available for computing solutions to EPECs, a host of avenues have been presented in the literature, including sequential nonlinear complementarity (NCP) methods [41, 20] and Jacobi and Gauss-Seidel schemes that rely on cycling through the set of agents, each of whom computes a local solution to a parametrized MPEC [21, 26, 41] . In Section 6.2, we consider a class of stochastic multi-leader multi-follower game that arises in two-settlement power markets [36] . In this context, we again compare the minimizers of the potential function with the equilibria obtained from the GaussSeidel scheme. In effect our comparison is between a Gauss-Seidel type algorithm for computing the equilibrium of a potential multi-leader multi-follower game with shared constraints and the algorithm that seeks a global minimizer of the potential function by solving an MPEC. Additionally, we consider a setting where potential functions may be unavailable and examine whether the use of penalized consistent conjectures improves the performance of Gauss-Seidel schemes.
A multi-leader multi-follower Cournot game
In this section, we examine a variant of the multi-leader multi-follower game examined by Sherali [37] . Specifically, we consider a game comprising of N leaders and N followers. Suppose, follower f participates in an N -player Nash-Cournot game in which the prices are given by p(ȳ +x) = a − b(ȳ +x) wherē y = f y f ,x = i x i and follower f is characterized by quadratic convex costs given by
f . The follower problem, denoted by F f (ȳ −f , x), is defined as:
where constants a, b and d f are positive for f = 1, . . . , N . The convexity of the follower problems implies that the follower equilibrium is given by the solution to a linear complementarity problem:
Similarly, the leaders are also assumed to play in a Nash-Cournot game with a price function given by p(x) = a − bx. Suppose the i th leader has a quadratic convex cost of production given by 1 2 c i x 2 i and solves the following parametrized problem:
We note that the leader level problem is a potential game and the associated potential function is given by the following:
We consider the modification in the form E cc for this game and compute the minimizer of π over F cc . The resulting MPEC is given by the following: We compare the minimizers of P cc with the equilibria of the original unmodified game. Recall that Proposition 3.2 provides that every equilibrium of E is an equilibrium of E cc ; however it is not necessary that this equilibrium also be a minimizer of the potential function of E cc . Remarkably, our simulations show that the minimizer of the potential function and the equilibria of the original game do coincide. For randomly generated costs and for increasing N , solutions to an unmodified form of the game were generated via a Gauss-Seidel heuristic. In such a heuristic for obtaining solutions to a multi-leader multi-follower game requires cycling through each of the agents, each of whom obtains a solution to the parametrized MPEC. Each cycle, referred to as a major iteration, requires solving a sequence of N agent-specific MPECs. Note that when the i th agent solves his associated MPEC during the k th cycle, he employs z k 1 , . . . , z k i−1 and z
N , reflecting the Gauss-Seidel structure of the scheme. If change in the tuple of forward decisions falls within a pre-specified tolerance, the scheme terminates. The number of cycles is denoted by GS-iter while the overall complexity is captured by the number of major iterations required by the knitro solver [4] , denoted by maj-epec. Note that the Gauss-Seidel scheme is terminated if the number of cycles exceeds 100. While the nonlinear programming solver knitro can obtain stationary points of MPECs, global solutions require utilizing global optimization solvers such as baron. We employed knitro for solving P cc and compared the obtained solution z mpec to its EPEC counterpart z epec and also provided the number of major iterations required (denoted by maj-mpec). Table 1 displays the results for randomly generated problems with increasing N .
Observations and insights:
• First, the solutions to the MPEC track the EPEC solutions closely in most instances. When there is a disparity between these solutions, this can often be traced to the lack of convergence in the Gauss-Seidel solver (such as when N = 29, 35); however, there are instances when there is a disparity and the EPEC solver has terminated gracefully. We believe that this disparity may be related to the lack of uniqueness in the equilibria of E S .
• Second, the complexity associated with computing an MPEC solution is far smaller than that required for computing an EPEC solution. For instance, when N = 5, the MPEC solution requires a little more than 2% of that required to compute the EPEC solution. However, when N = 49, this ratio drops to approximately 0.1%.
• Finally, it should be noted that in this setting, computing stationary points sufficed; but, this may be a consequence of the convexity of the potential function.
A stochastic multi-leader multi-follower game
Next, we compare the computation equilibria by minimization of the potential function and by the Gauss-Seidel heuristic. We do this for a two-settlement spot-forward market under uncertainty [36] . Consider an N node network in which each node houses the generation facilities of a specific firm. Moreover, the i th firm can sell power at any other node, a possibility that is accommodated through a fully connected network. 4 Under realization ω, the sales of the i th firm at the j th node are denoted by s ω ij while the price in the spot market at node j is given by
The generation levels of firm i at denoted by g ω i , implying that
Therefore, the i th firm's optimization problem is given by The transmission prices, denoted by w ω , are a consequence of a revenue maximization problem solved by the transmission provider. More specifically, if w ω ij denotes the price of transmitting a unit of power across linkage (i, j), then the provider solves the following problem:
where y ω ij = s ω ij − s ω ji . Since the firm problems and the transmission provider's problems are linearly constrained convex programs, regularity holds immediately. As a consequence, the first-order KarushKuhn-Tucker conditions are sufficient and are compactly stated as
where M ω , N and q ω are defined in [36, Sec. 3] and z ω is defined as z ω s ω ; ψ ω ; α ω ; λ ω and y ω is eliminated. It is worth noting that the complementarity problem LCP(q ω +N f, M ω ) is not characterized by a positive definite M ω . In fact, it is shown that M ω is a P 0 matrix in [36] .
In the forward market, given the forward decisions of their competitor, a given firm is assumed to maximize its expected profit in forward and spot decisions subject to equilibrium in the spot-market. The forward market participants are viewed as leaders with respect to the followers in the spot-market game. The firm problem in the forward market may be compactly stated as a parametrized stochastic MPEC and is defined as follows: a large penalty parameter respectively on a set of test problems in which the number of nodes n and the number of scenarios s is varied. In each table, we have shown maj-iter (the number of cycles that the Gauss-Seidel scheme proceeds through before termination),
(the scaled difference in forward decisions upon termination), N i=2 z * 1 − z * i ∞ (the inconsistency in conjectures of follower equilibrium), and N i=1 z * * i − z * i ∞ (the deviation of z * i from z * * i , the solution of the best-response problem derived from solving L S i (z −i ) at z −i, * ). Note that if z * * i differs significantly from z * i , it suggests that z * i may not be an equilibrium.
n s maj-iter Table 2 : Performance of exact penalty scheme with ρ = 1e-3 n s maj-iter Table 3 : Performance of exact penalty scheme with ρ = 1e3
Finally, we compared the solutions obtained with a large penalty parameter to that obtained from minimizing the potential function. Since, the objective of each leader is independent of x and separable in y i , the sum of the objectives is a potential function. Leveraging this observation, we considered the following MPEC as problem P S : In this set of results, we examine the differences between MPEC and EPEC solutions is given by Table 4 . As seen in the previous subsection, the solutions to the MPEC correspond closely with those obtained from the EPEC. Note that in this table, z mpec represents the solution obtained from solving P S while z epec denotes the solution derived from a penalized Gauss-Seidel heuristic.
n s
u mpec − u epec ∞ Observations and insights:
• When employing a small penalty parameter, the scheme does not display convergence within a 30 iteration limit. However, with a larger penalty parameter, the scheme is seen to converge in 7-10 iterations in Figures 1 and 2 . More detailed tests provided in Tables 2 and 3 support these findings. In fact, we see that Table 3 , in all cases, the termination criteria are met. Recall that these criteria require that change in forward decisions be relatively small.
• Furthermore, it is seen that neither the disparity in leader decisions nor the consistency in follower decisions are seen to converge to zero when the penalty parameter is small, as per Figures 2 and 3; in contrast, both quantities converge with a larger penalty parameter, which in effect correspond to solutions of modifications with shared constraints. In more detailed tests, we observe that the Gauss-Seidel scheme with small penalty parameter converged infrequently, as in Table 2 . However, when the penalty parameter was large, the Gauss-Seidel scheme converged in almost all runs, as seen in Table 3 . Whenever the scheme did converge, in most instances, the follower decisions were consistent.
• From Table 4 , it is seen that the solutions to the EPEC derived from solving the modified problem correspond closely with solutions derived from a single MPEC. Note that knitro produces stationary points; yet, in this instance, these stationary points appeared to bear a close resemblance to what could possibly be global equilibria.
Conclusions
In this paper, we considered a multi-leader multi-follower game and examined the question of when a global equilibrium exists. A standard approach requires ascertaining when the reaction map admits fixed points. However, this avenue has several hindrances, an important one being the lack of continuity in the solution set associated with the equilibrium constraints capturing the follower equilibrium. We observed that these challenges are alleviated partially in multi-leader multi-follower game with shared constraints and present modified formulations that result in such games. In the context of such problems, this paper made the following contributions. We showed that when the leader-level problem admits a potential function, the set of global minimizers of the potential function over the shared constraint are the equilibria of the multi-leader multi-follower game; in effect, this reduced to a question of the existence of an equilibrium to that of the existence of a solution to an optimization problem, in particular an MPEC. The latter exists under standard conditions -e.g., coercive objective over a nonempty feasible region -and the existence of a global equilibrium was seen to follow. We further showed that local minima, B-stationary points, strong-stationary points and second-order strong stationary points of this MPEC are local Nash equilibria, Nash B-stationary points, Nash strong-stationary points and Nash second-order strong-stationary points of the shared constraint multi-leader multi-follower game. Notably, we also identified subclasses of the non-shared constraint multi-leader multi-follower games for which the existence of equilibria can be guaranteed.
We applied these findings towards the analysis and computation of several classes of multi-leader multi-follower games. Specifically, we showed analytically that the global minimizers of the associated MPECs are indeed global equilibria of a shared constraint multi-leader multi-follower symmetric Cournot game. We examined certain computational schemes and applied them on asymmetric Cournot game as well as stochastic spot-forward power markets. We found that particularly in the context of spotforward markets, equilibria of shared-constraint modification of the multi-leader multi-follower game were possible to compute via a penalized variant of the Gauss-Seidel heuristic while convergence behavior of unpenalized variants, which corresponded to the original game without shared constraints, was far poorer. Furthermore, the solutions of MPECs corresponding to the minimization of the potential function were indeed equilibria of the shared constraint multi-leader multi-follower games and in these settings, such solutions were obtained with far less effort.
